Finding the Right Executive: The Challenge of Securing Top Talent - Essay Sample

Introduction

In real life basis occasions, finding a correct executive who works with the guidelines of the company to achieve the specified goals and objectives is quite tricky. An executive who can motivate other junior employees in the company, he who can work with the mission, vision, codes of ethics and principles to ensure success, one who can persuade and convince investors to join the company and provide more resources, capital or generally assets, have the necessary technical know-how and understanding of various ways of interventions that can be used to address some problems in the company. It is primarily a hard task.

Is your time best spent reading someone else’s essay? Get a 100% original essay FROM A CERTIFIED WRITER!

Order now

Although, the fact is that excellent executives exist, but to attract them, a company should have well-set objectives and goals. However, the size of the firm is the most significant determinant of executive behavior in a business (Mehran, 1995). So typically, the size of the firm has a vital role to play on the process of choosing executives to work in the respective positions in an organization. Another important aspect is the point of compensating executives.

For a more substantial business, there are higher chances that the gross and the net income obtained can be higher. One possible reason that could make the company be more significant or considered as substantial is a well-organized structure, with good governance and plans, availability of the necessary resources and equipment needed in the company, availability of the competitive working staff that is well trained and has the minds for creativity and innovations.

For this reason, it is useful and much convenient to note that with a large firm, the compensation granted to the executives will be definitely higher, compared to the smaller businesses, who only collect a little amount of revenue and thus deducting some of the profits for the sake of compensation would interfere with general management of the firm. Therefore, when there is a good relationship between the size of the firm and the executive compensation, more upper-level executives can be attracted to the company (Kostiuk, 1990). On contrary opinion, in the case where there is a weak relationship, this may mean that the size of the firm is small, and thus the top-level executives are not competent enough, rated as either middle or lower class executive in terms of their potentials. Chances of securing other qualified top leveled managers may also be a problem since the offers from the smaller companies may not match with their demands.

Recommendation

The very first fundamental way by which firms can operate to target the interests of their shareholders is by acting good to all of their corporate citizens. The company may achieve this by remaining useful to its community or society that the company is situated in. Providing profit estimates which are not over-ambitious but realistic is another form of attracting the shareholder's interests. This may be done by setting up the goals depending on the current company's level of performance and not it's kind of performance that is predicted to be implemented in the future (Mehran, 1995). The third way of ensuring that the relationship operations favor most of the shareholders is by being transparent in the corporation activities. This is because, most investors before they join any business for partnership or collaboration, they do ask for the financial statements, so that they can countercheck and make appropriate decisions that suit their aims and expectations. With these all recommendations, a good relationship can ensure that they attract more investors into the company, to add on the possible expected annual, semi-annual, or quarterly turnout.

References

Kostiuk, P. F. (1990). Firm size and executive compensation. Journal of Human Resources, 90-105. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/145728

Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of financial economics, 38(2), 163-184. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0304405X9400809F