Deficiencies in the FSA - Essay Example

The basis of the issue of the control of marine security is on various rules that are acceptable whose agreement is through IMO or the international maritime organization. The organization is a UN institution of 1984 whose primary focus is on security at the sea and the safety of various maritime environments (Kontovas and Psaraftis 2009). Decisions on matters concerning marine security are by SOLAS and those on the protection of the maritime environment by MEPC.

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There is a noticeable change in issues concerning safety in the marine system. It is, however, evident that many of the implementations involving maritime security always come in the aftermath of a great disaster or severe accident. The approach is, however, questionable and leaves individuals wondering why a disaster has first to occur for the modification of existing safety measures to take place.

It is in this line that the international shipping company is adjusting from a post active to a pre active method using the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA). There is also another method that is also an active instrument, the Goal Based Standards, and there are discussions on linking the GBS and FSA (Kontovas, Psaraftis and Polytechneiou 2006). The FSA was put in place by the IMO as a systematic and rational procedure for assessing any risks concerning maritime security, protection of maritime environments and the evaluation of the benefits and costs of the options put in place by the IMO to reduce these risks.

The approach has in place a framework for addressing various safety issues in the maritime security area. However, as a safety at sea approach, the FSA faces numerous challenges to which it must respond just like other similar procedures. It needs to be proactive whereby the plan needs to anticipate disasters rather than waiting till they happen (Gerigk 2007). It also needs t be systematic where it uses a process that is structured and formal. There is also the necessity of transparency where there are clarity and justification for the levels of safety achieved at a particular point in time. It should also be cost-effective where it strikes a balance between security especially the reduction of threat and the effect it has on the partners of the control measures proposed.

To ensure that the FSA adheres to the guidelines the IMO recommends a five-step approach which includes the identification of a hazard, the assessment of risk, options for risk prevention, analysis of the costs and benefits and various suggestions for the making of decisions. Therefore many of the deficiencies are present in the five-step approach by the FSA (Hu, Fang, Xia and Xi 2007). There is a preliminary step before the first one which involves the definition of the identified problem and any other constraints that come with it including operations, systems and goals.

The step has the function of defining the hazard under analysis concerning the regulations under review or for development. It is, therefore, a crucial step in the process and during some instances, the FSA may make mistakes e.g. coming up with a definition that is less-than-precise. It may make deficient definitions of aspects including ship operations, ship category or external influences which mean inadequate recommendations and also the exclusion of important groups that need assessment.

A deficiency in the first step of evaluation means that the whole process is at risk of not addressing the issue it is intended to address. It means that assessment of an issue that may not be of top priority may be done instead of the identified hazard (Psaraftis 2012). The approach also works on the identification of risks in its second step. During this stage, only those risks that are visible during this step go through further assessment steps. Any hazard that may come after this step will not be under consideration for assessment which may be fatal to the study the FSA is conducting.

Another deficiency occurs during the risk analysis phase where the approach only applies the use of a problematic quantitative method of assessment for risk (Yang and Wang 2008). Issues may vary from environmental harm, loss of people or even ship loss. It, therefore, means that there needs to be a standard unit for risk analysis of the various issues expected (Yang, Ng and Wang 2013). The FSA may, therefore, opt for an approach that is more qualitative because it is more reliable and has a small proneness to problems. The cost benefit analysis comes with the deficiency of bias or manipulation. It is the step that any person who would want to manipulate the results of the FSA, he or she will do it during this step. It means that the individual makes sure that the assessment arrives at a result that is preferred. These, therefore, are the various deficiencies of the Formal Safety Assessment approach.

Possible applications of FSA

The approach can be useful in various maritime safety areas. One of these sectors is the carriage of cargoes and containers. There are instances where cargoes and containers have cause accidents at the shore or are discovered to be carrying dangerous items. The FSA may, therefore, conduct an assessment of such an issue to develop recommendations for proactively addressing it (Ventikos, and Psaraftis 2004). The approach may also provide recommendations for the further improvement of navigation safety. The IMO has improved on navigation safety over the years, but new challenges are frequently experiences especially concerning shipping. FSA, therefore, may be an assessment tool for other variations of safety issues that may focus mainly on movement at sea.

Another area of application for the FSA is in the ship operations, design and equipment. The make and operations of ships have advanced over the years due to the advancement of technology. However, waters have changed too due to climatic changes experienced around the world. It means that there might be areas of developed ships that may not work as expected and may be points of risk exposure to issues like accidents (Yang, Wang and Li 2013). FSA can, therefore, conduct an assessment of various areas in the ship design, equipment and operations.

There is also the human element that brings various risks especially when it comes to maritime safety. Measures and adjustments put in place are usually towards the security in people and other areas that may require security. Humans are the primary drivers of activities at the sea which mean that they are at a risk of various disasters or accidents (Lois, Wang, Wall and Ruxton 2004). The FSA, therefore, needs to work around the issue of the human element and identify and risks people have exposure to while at sea and help provide recommendations for dealing with such matters. It may also work towards assessment of risks the ship possess to the environment and a way forward on how to approach the identified issues.

References

Gerigk, M., 2007. A model of performance-oriented risk-based assessment of safety of container ships. Polish Maritime Research, pp.53-57.

Hu, S., Fang, Q., Xia, H. and Xi, Y., 2007. Formal safety assessment based on relative risks model in ship navigation. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 92(3), pp.369-377.

Kontovas, C.A. and Psaraftis, H.N., 2009. Formal safety assessment: a critical review. Marine technology, 46(1), pp.45-59.

Kontovas, C.A., Psaraftis, H.N. and Polytechneiou, I., 2006. Formal safety assessment: A critical review and ways to strengthen it and make it more transparent. National Technical LIniversity of Athens (November).

Lois, P., Wang, J., Wall, A. and Ruxton, T., 2004. Formal safety assessment of cruise ships. Tourism Management, 25(1), pp.93-109.

Psaraftis, H.N., 2012. Formal Safety Assessment: an updated review. Journal of marine science and technology, 17(3), pp.390-402.

Ventikos, N.P. and Psaraftis, H.N., 2004. Spill accident modeling: a critical survey of the event-decision network in the context of IMOs formal safety assessment. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 107(1), pp.59-66.

Yang, Z., Ng, A.K. and Wang, J., 2013. Prioritising security vulnerabilities in ports. International Journal of Shipping and Transport Logistics, 5(6), pp.622-636.

Yang, Z.L., Wang, J. and Li, K.X., 2013. Maritime safety analysis in retrospect. Maritime Policy & Management, 40(3), pp.261-277.

Yang, Z.L. and Wang, J., 2008. Ship formal safety assessment. Maritime Safety, Security and Piracy, pp.31-53.