Paper Example on Military Science

1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Military Intervention

One advantage of military intervention in Darfur is the prevention of large-scale loss of lives and promotion of human rights. The government of Darfur failed to act in the best interests of its citizens. It was part of the problem that led to the development of militia groups that killed even more civilians (Belloni, 2006). In such instances, military interventions by the international community seem necessary. They are more qualified and likely to help prevent the loss of lives on such a large scale. The protection of human rights warrants the need to ensure the safety of citizens in Darfur in instances where their government has seriously failed to do the same. Intervention can also prevent opportunistic violence from militia groups in the short-term perspective. The presence of international militaries prevents groups from accessing some regions that are hot zones for civilian engagement. The militias are kept at bay and citizens can go for a longer period without being attacked by groups paid by the government to facilitate attacks. The case of Darfur showcases that the government was aware of the international presence and did not want to appear to be in support of these militias, which promoted a more laid-back approach that kept civilians safe in some areas.

Is your time best spent reading someone else’s essay? Get a 100% original essay FROM A CERTIFIED WRITER!

Order now

However, there are some arguments against this notion of the protection of human rights. In some instances, military intervention can lead to more loss of lives as it creates opportunistic violence. To begin with, opportunistic violence occurs when groups in these war torn areas instigate violence in order to attract more aid. In Darfur, for instance, local groups knew they could attract sympathy and reaction from the international community if they garnered the needed attention. Groups started a violence that was ethically premeditated to ensure they received attention from the international community. The patterns were similar to the case involving Kosovo Albanians that wanted international support and begun a violent movement (Belloni, 2006). Many militias often want to negotiate their terms and find international support, which leads to violence to attract attention. Since intervention is always reactive, such a plan takes effect and creates more instances of violence than the war that is being fought. Additionally, military intervention gives many groups within the community a reason to arm themselves, which increases the opportunity for violence. Local movements in Darfur were radicalized and led to the loss of even more lives due to military interventions. It is also imperative to explore the aftermath of military intervention from the perspective of long-term effects. In this case, military intervention is often associated with short-term effects that leave the local populations with more to think about in the long-term. For instance, the intervention did very little to stop the government-induced military groups that terrorized citizens in Darfur for a long time. The Khartoum government armed Arab militias who constantly attacked the farmers of Masalit and Zaghawa. The same case continued on an even larger scale after the interventions (Belloni, 2006). The international community left many Darfur civilians with the long-term effects of dealing with these militias who had taken advantage of the opportunistic violence created to launch the agenda of the government. Moreover, the militias gained courage and made unnecessary demands. Even after the signing of the peace treaty in Darfur, they still continued to terrorize locals, which continued the violence and created an even bigger problem of the continuation of citizens suffering.

2. Humanitarian Aid and Opportunistic Violence

Humanitarian aid prevents opportunistic violence by keeping militias at bay. For instance, the mere presence of AU peacekeepers in Darfur, for instance, prevented the Janjaweed rebels from attacking citizens haphazardly as was the case before (Belloni, 2006). The groups that developed as a result of the war had to be cautious even though the peacekeepers did not seem particularly interested in violence. Peacekeeping can also prevent violence since it leads to compromises (De Waal, 2007). The prospect of UN troops was enough to enable Darfurians to begin exploring any compromises they may trade for their safety. They were willing to go the extra mile politically and welcomed the idea of UN troops that came with the aid to help people that were still suffering from the effects of war. The presence of such aid discouraged more fights for a short period as individuals concentrated on what he humanitarians brought and how it would help them. Peace negotiations can also prevent opportunistic violence since the groups come to an agreement that befits both sides. For instance, the 2006 Darfur ceasefire was honored to a small extent and managed to prevent violence for a short period. Sudan leaders also considered the effects of the NATO agreement on the peace in Kosovo and were optimistic wanted to be part of ensuring the humanitarian approached worked in a similar manner (De Waal, 2007). The support of such leaders was essential in preventing opportunistic violence since they were also part of the problem with militias.

At the same time, humanitarian aid can advance opportunistic violence since most of the peace talks are usually short-lived. For instance, there have been several agreements in Darfur with little success. The rationale is that there were very many militia groups in the country with different motivations, finances, and perpetrators. After the Ndajema ceasefire, most of these groups continued their violent operations since they were motivated by parties outside of the peace agreement (De Waal, 2007). The groups cannot be all dissolved and come back with a more violent agenda. Their leaders were not part of the peace talks, which meant that they would still fuel violence in Darfur since they were not part of the tabled agreements.

3. Developmental Aid and Opportunistic Violence

Developmental aid was effective in preventing opportunistic violence since it addressed the problems at the grassroots level. The international community involved in the mission in Darfur realized the danger posed on displaced persons living in camps. To begin with, they were more likely to join militia groups and help perpetuate the violence since most thought they had nothing to lose and were vulnerable enough to be coerced. Additionally, displaced persons were in danger of being targets especially if they belonged to enemy groups. Therefore, part of the developmental aid offered was at the community level. The DPA demilitarization protocol involved training police officers inside the camps and empowering the communities with knowledge about the effects of the war. The AMIS group trained the police officers to offer more protection for displaced persons and offered them a purpose (De Waal, 2007). The community was more informed and aware of their role in the conflict. All of this kept violence militias from infiltrating these camps. It protected displaced people and helped to prevent them from being used for opportunistic violence. Empowering communities at the grassroots level was one step towards weakening militias. However, civilian policing was not properly informed in some areas in Darfur. The government was also sabotaging this empowerment approach as best as possible and created room for opportunistic violence (Azam, 2006). The DPA also fell short on implementation strategies given that the war had affected many part of Darfur. The lack of proper execution placed many civilians in danger. Those who were left homeless had to support the militias to survive while those with no use to them were killed.

References

Azam, J. P. (2006). On thugs and heroes: Why warlords victimize their own civilians. Economics of Governance, 7(1), 53-73.

Belloni, R. (2006). The Tragedy of Darfur and the Limits of the 'Responsibility to Protect'. Ethnopolitics, 5(4), 327-346.

De Waal, A. (2007). Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect. International Affairs, 83(6), 1039-1054.