Introduction
Hurricane Katrina was an exceptionally powerful and fatal hurricane that sculpted a broad swath of disastrous damage and inflicted a huge loss of life. It was one of the five deadliest hurricanes to strike the United States of America's coast during the last 100 years. Katrina caused extensive devastation along the central Gulf Coast states of the U.S. with cities like New Orleans, Mobile and Gulfport bearing the wrath of its force. According to Knabb et al. (2011, p. 11), approximately 1833 people died. In terms of physical damage, Katrina's cost was estimated to be around US$ 250 billion, the most expensive natural disaster in American history (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 11).
According to Knabb et al. (2011, p. 1), the complex origin of Katrina involved the interaction of a tropical wave, the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical Depression Ten, and an upper tropospheric trough. The trough, located over the Western Atlantic and the Bahamas, produced strong westerly shear across Tropical Depression Ten, causing it to degenerate on 14 August about 825 n mi east of Barbados (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 1). The low-level circulation continually weakened while proceeding westward, and it finally dissipated on 21 August near Cuba. Meanwhile, a middle tropospheric circulation emerging from Tropical Depression Ten lagged behind and passed north of the Leeward Islands on 18-19 August (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 1). A tropical wave, which left the west coast of Africa on 11 August, progressed through the Leeward Islands, united with the middle tropospheric remains of Tropical Depression Ten on 19 August, and resulted in a large area of rain and thunderstorms north of Puerto Rico.
The activity pursued to move slowly northwestward, passing north of Hispaniola and then combining just east of the Turks and Caicos on 22 August (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 2). The Upper tropospheric trough weakened as it moved westward toward Florida, and the shear relaxed sufficiently to enable the system to develop into a tropical depression by 1800 UTC on 23 August over the southeastern Bahamas approximately 175 n mi southeast of Nassau (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 2). The depression progressed to become organized over the central Bahamas during the evening of 23 August (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 2). Deep convection developed overnight in the eastern semicircle of the cyclone and became a well-defined band that started to wrap around the north side of the circulation center early on the morning of 24 August (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 2). The cyclone became Katrina, the 11th tropical storm of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season, at 1200 UTC 24 August when it was centered over the central Bahamas around 65 n mi east-southeast of Nassau (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 2).
At first, the storm moved northwestward within a weakness in the lower tropospheric subtropical ridge (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 2). Nevertheless, as it developed an inner core and developed into a deeper cyclone on 24 August, it came under the effect of a strengthening middle to the upper tropospheric ridge over the Gulf of Mexico and the southern United States (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 3). The ridge turned Katrina westward on 25 August towards Southern Florida and made its initial landfall in the United States as a Category 1 hurricane, with maximum sustained winds or 70 knots (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 3). As the storm moved southwest across the tip of the Florida peninsula, Katrina's winds reduced slightly before recovering hurricane strength in the Gulf of Mexico. Considering that Katrina spent only seven hours over land, its strength was not significantly reduced and it quickly re-intensified shortly after moving over the warm waters of the Gulf. The atmospheric and sea-surface conditions were instrumental in the cyclone's fast intensification, which lead to Katrina reaching 'major hurricane' ranking on the afternoon of 26 August (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 3).
The loss of life and property damage was worsened by breaks in the levees that separate New Orleans from the surrounding lakes such as Lake Pontchartrain (Seed et al., 2008 p. 2). Several of the levees and floodwalls were overtopped at different times on the day of the landfall. Approximately 80% of New Orleans was under floodwater on 31 August mainly because of the levee failures from Lake Pontchartrain (Seed et al., 2008 p. 2). Following the difficulties caused by additional flooding related to the late September 2005 passage of Hurricane Rita to the south, all floodwaters had been removed from the city of New Orleans by 11 October, 43 days after Katrina's landfall (Seed et al., 2008 p. 2). Presumably, most of the deaths, mostly in Louisiana, were directly associated with the extensive storm surge-induced flooding and its aftermath in the New Orleans area (Knabb et al., 2011, p. 11).
San Bernardino Terrorist Attack
On December 2, 2015, San Bernardino County workers at the Inland Regional Center (IRC) were gathering for a training meeting (Braziel, Straub, Watson, and Hoops, 2016, p. 1). The IRC is a not-for-profit entity that avails services to people with developmental disabilities and their families. During the meeting, terrorists attacked, killing 14 citizens and injuring 22 in the most fatal attack on American soil since the twin bombing on September 11, 2001 (Lee, Walters, Borger, Clem, Fenati, Kiemeney, & Smith, 2016, p. 1). Syed Rizwan Farook, a county environmental health specialist, attended but later left the building during the meeting (Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 2). Farook and his wife, Tashfeen Malik later returned to the building dressed in dark military-style regalia and unleashed terror on his coworkers and others in attendance.
The assailants carried 3 rifles and 2 semi-automatic handguns, 12 pipe bombs and 4,500 rounds of ammunition (Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 2). They had legally bought all the weapons in California between 2007 and 2012. The couple purchased the handguns, while a third suspect, Enrique Marquez Jr., bought the two rifles in 2011 and 2012 (Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 2). The shootings started at approximately 11:00 AM when the couple entered the building from the east side, and fired around 75 rounds (Lee et al., 2016, p. 2; Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 2). The shooting lasted approximately five minutes before the assailants left the scene in a black SUV. They left behind three pipe bombs wired to a remote control. However, the bombs did not detonate.
Later in the afternoon, a shootout ensued between the police and the assailants, a gun battle that ended the attackers' lives. After a raid at their residence, police found about 2,000 9-millimeter rounds, around 2,500 .223 rounds, several .22 long rifle rounds and 19 pipes that could be converted into bombs (Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 2). Barak and Margolin (2015, p. 2) added that the hard drive of their computer was missing and two new cell phones were found destroyed and discarded in the trash.
Investigations established that Syed Rizwan Farook was an American-born citizen of Pakistan origin. He was born in Illinois and raised in California (Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 3). He traveled to Saudi Arabia twice and once to Pakistan. Farook met his wife through an online dating service. They were both radicalized when they met. Between 2012 and 2014, Farook frequented Riverside Mosque. During the shooting period, he prayed at the Dar Al Uloom Al Islamiyah-Amer Mosque in San Bernadino, California (Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 4). Tashfeen Malik was a Pakistani and came to the U.S. on a fiancee visa after her marriage to Farook in Pakistan. The couple had a daughter, Maryam Bint Rizwan, born on May 21, 2015. The third assailant, Enrique Marquez Jr., was Farook's friend and neighbor. In 2011 and 2012, he purchased the two semi-automatic rifles used in the attack.
Additionally, while Tashfeen is believed to have connections to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Farook had encountered both Al Nusra and Al Shabaab (Barak & Margolin, 2015, p. 6). During the attack, Tashfeen pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in a Facebook post. ISIS, through a radio station broadcast, declared the attackers were supporters of the group and applauded them for the attack. In those chaotic hours, numerous law enforcement officers, firefighters, and medical practitioners responded to three separate scenes, namely, the IRC, the officer-involved shooting scene, and the attackers' home. They collectively strived to secure the scenes, treat and transport the victims, investigate the incidents, and identify and locate the attackers, all while facing threats of incidental attacks and feasible explosive detonations. As Braziel et al. (2016, p. 1) recorded, the preliminary investigation that followed unearthed that the assailants planned, targeted and attacked Farook's colleagues in an act of terrorism.
Response of the Emergency Service
Response to Hurricane Katrina
Emergency response to Katrina began on 27 August when voluntary evacuations started in Louisiana. President Bush declared a state of emergency and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and state emergency responders began 24-hour operations. By the evening of 27 August, the National Weather Service warned that levees could be topped in New Orleans, leading to catastrophic flooding (Moynihan, 2009, p. 2). Thus, New Orleans's Mayor, Ray Nagin, ordered a compulsory evacuation by 9:30 AM on 28 August and the Superdome was opened as a refuge for last resort (Moynihan, 2009, p. 2). Katrina hit at 6:10 AM on 29 August, and later that morning levees started to be breached and overtopped. Search and rescue operations resumed by 29 August afternoon, but communications also started to fail around the same time. On 30 August, the Mayor opened the Morial Convention Center as a shelter (Moynihan, 2009, p. 2). Two days later, buses eventually arrived to start evacuations from the Superdome, but evacuations were not finished until 5 October, and some people remained stranded on highways until 6 October (Moynihan, 2009, p. 2).
The crucial period of response lasted just over a weak. It involved an inter-governmental and cross-sectoral network of stakeholders. The introduction of a National Response Plan in 2004 sought to formalize the role and responsibilities of at least some of the primary participants in crisis response (Moynihan, 2009, p. 2). The Plan established a series of Emergency Support Functions for various federal agencies to avail support to FEMA. FEMA's primary role for extensive disasters is to act as a coordinator, controlling the capacities of the federal government while collaborating with state responders (Moynihan, 2009, p. 2). The state and city health departments also played a crucial role in the emergency response to Katrina. According to VanDevanter, Leviss, Abramson, Howard, and Honore (2010, p. 16), Katrina placed enormous strain on the public health systems of the Gulf Coast region of Louisiana and Mississippi. The response of the state health departments in these states, along with the City of New Orleans Department of Health (CNODH), was crucial in the management of this public health disaster (VanDevanter et al., 2010, p. 16). Working alongside other traditional emergency responders, public health workers undertook emergency responder roles.
The Katrina response network was so big that there was a failure to understand fully all the stakeholders involved, the skills they offered, and how their capacities could be used. Mainly, this was attributed to a large voluntary component. These entities responded to a principal goal: minimizing the suffering and loss of life that resulted...
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