Essay Sample on Fire Fighters: Line of Duty Death

Introduction

The death of a firefighter is a disastrous tragedy that evokes multiple emotions and sentiments. Among them is the culture and tribute associated with memorizing the firefighter as having died in the line of duty. During a Line of Duty-Death (LODD) event, a commander may find it fitting to direct an Incident Management Team. The operations and resolutions made in the initial crucial hours and days following a LODD make lasting imprints on survivors, remaining family members, workers, and community groups. Every LODD case is diverse and requires logical judgment by local management in tremendously traumatic situations. The paper presents a case of NIOSH fire service incident LODD.

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On 24th August 2009, a male lieutenant (Charles McCarthy) passed away after a floor failure into a cellar fire while a career firefighter (Jonathan Croom) was critically injured and later died while trying to save the lieutenant. According to CDC reports, the lieutenant had been with the fire section for over 22 years. He was a lieutenant for about 12 years. The lieutenant had done more than 2,200 reported hours of drill on subjects including firefighting fundamentals, ladder corporation activities, fire conduct, fire attack, structural collapse, risky materials, and search and rescue operations. The second victim had been with the fire department for over one decade as a firefighter. He had undertaken more than 800 reported hours of exercise on subjects including fundamental and immediate fire-fighting, stepladder corporation tasks, risky materials and fire conduct (CDC, 1).

The fire incident occurred in Genesee Street, Buffalo, New York. The fire event happened in a two and a one-half story building with one story garage linked to the weak and an incomplete cellar. At about 0351 hours on 24th August 2009, fire crews were posted to a fire with the following reports of trapped residents in the building. The first fire engine was met by a resident who engaged them to a side door where he indicated that he had heard people asking for help. Rescue tasks were fixated on side entry which ended to the basement staircases. A subsequent search was commenced on the second floor as there were reports that there was a possibility of trapped people. The following units complemented operations in these areas based on the reports made by the bystanders (Naum, 1).

The first floor comprised a delicatessen that was highly strengthened. Steel mesh overlapped the front display windows. On the side, there were strongly fitted solid panes. The major entry point, a commercial door situated near the half corner, had a tamper-proof steel safety gate during the time of the fire event. At about 0422 hours, Rescue 1 members entered the delicatessen to confirm that all firefighters were commanded out of the first floor. In less than two minutes from their entry, the mechanical fittings reinforcing the floor caved in under and around a set of viable wall chillers situated at the rear of the delicatessen. Lieutenant McCarthy was one of the casualties as he fell into the cellar and the floor buckled under him.

The other officers in the Rescue 1 team were oblivious of the breakdown; they only reported loud noise which was not easily locatable. After falling, McCarthy started making distressed calls, asking for assistance over the radio and to those who could hear him. The lieutenant could not be heard because he was below the Rescue 1 team grade level. The fire team left the building from the side, uninformed that their lieutenant was in danger. At about 0423, it was determined that a Rescue 1 team member was in grave danger and needed to be rescued. FF Croom entered the structure through the delicatessen door to start a rescue operation. He did not make it through as he fell through the first floor into the cellar in close vicinity to the lieutenant (Naum, 1).

The rescue command focused on rescuing the lieutenant, unaware that there was another victim in danger. Even after undertaking a head count, rescue members in FF Croom's team did not report his absence. Rescue operations at this instance focused on the first floor where there was a low possibility of danger. At the storefront, firefighters reported hearing an activation of pass alarm but could not locate its origin because of the serious fire conditions. The floor continued to collapse prompting the command to rule that it was impossible to conduct a rescue operation in those conditions. After some time, it was determined that FF Croom was missing. Later on, rescue operation became successful, and Lt McCarthy and FF Croom were rescued (CDC, 1). However, it was too late for them to survive the operation. The two firefighters died in the line of duty.

Professional injuries and casualties are usually the outcomes of one or more causative elements or major occurrences in a bigger progression of occurrences that eventually lead to injury or casualty. The fire incident in this case that caused the casualties were reported to have been caused by operating above an unregulated, free-burning basement fire; insufficient risk-versus-gain evaluations; lack of crew integrity and lack of communication involving interior condition reports to the command. The county health inspector's office reported that the two victims of fire died on inhaling products or combustion.

This fire incident raised numerous concerns about the safety of firefighters. It was recommended that fire departments should train personnel in that they were conscious of the risks of working above the fire, particularly cellar fire. The fire department should ensure that fire fighters develop and execute a standard operating procedure that deals with approaches and diplomacies for this kind of fire. A Firefighter should be conscious of quick heat buildup, freshening frameworks, availability issues and the presence of hazardous materials (McKinnon, 42). Basically, the firefighters should have background information regarding the fire incident in the shortest time possible. During this fire occurrence, firefighters were incapable of accessing the basements, powerless to aerate the cellar fire and uninformed on the fire load imminent in the vault. Primarily, the fire response team did not drill a hole in the first floor in fear of injuring the trapped civilians. Efforts to flow water on the first floor where fire seeped through was not effective. The firefighter failed to realize that fire seepage through a floor was a sign of floor weakness.

The fire department should also guarantee that the fire incident commandant acquires that status updates and continues assessing danger-versus-gain. One of the most crucial responsibilities of the first firefighter on the site is evaluating a preliminary size-up of the fire occurrence. A suitable size-up starts from the instance the alarm is given, and it progresses until the fire is managed. A size-up ought to entail evaluations of danger-versus-merit during the fire event tasks.

Works Cited

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Career Lieutenant Dies Following Floor Collapse into Basement Fire and a Career Fire Fighter Dies Attempting to Rescue the Career Lieutenant - New York. (2010). Retrieved from: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200923.html on date 26/11/2018

McKinnon, Ron. Safety Management: Near Miss Identification, Recognition, and Investigation. CRC Press. 2012. Print

Naum, Christopher. Lessons from the Fireground-Buffalo, New York Genesee Street Fire. (2016). Retrieved from: http://www.firegroundleadership.com/2016/08/24/lessons-from-the-fireground-buffalo-new-york-genesee-street-fire/ on date 26/11/2018